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When the Fourth Estate’s
Well Runs Dry
“When the Well’s dry, we know the Worth of Water.”1
Benjamin Franklin, 1746
INTRODUCTION
On June 8, 1789, James Madison introduced to the first
Congress a list of proposed amendments to the U. S. Constitution.2
The list, which would eventually evolve into the Bill of Rights,
included the following: “The people shall not be deprived or
abridged of their right to speak, to write, or to publish their
sentiments; and the freedom of the press, as one of the great
bulwarks of liberty, shall be inviolable.”3 Though these words
went through several further rounds of revision,4 it was
Madison’s proposal that gave birth to the First Amendment, the
single sentence in the Constitution that, among other things,
bestows freedom upon the press.5
Since its drafting, courts, legislators, and scholars have
all debated the Framers’ purpose for the Press Clause—whether
its placement within the First Amendment intentionally
separates the institutional press from the everyday speaker, or,
instead, whether the phrase simply broadens the scope of a
citizen’s freedom to speak.6 And while essentially no evidence
can point directly to the Framers’ intent with respect to the
inclusion of “or of the press” in the First Amendment, our

1 BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, POOR RICHARD’S ALMANACK AND OTHER WRITINGS
(eds., Bob Blaisdsell) 17 (2013).
2 LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE FOURTH ESTATE AND THE CONSTITUTION: FREEDOM
OF THE PRESS IN AMERICA 45 (1991).
3 Id. at 45–47 (emphasis added).
4 Id. at 46–47; LYRISSA BARNETT LIDSKY & R. GEORGE WRIGHT, FREEDOM OF
THE PRESS: A REFERENCE GUIDE TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 4 (2004).
5 U.S. CONST. amend. I; POWE, JR., supra note 2, at 23.
6 U.S. CONST. amend. I; LIDSKY & WRIGHT, supra note 4, at 2–8. For purposes
of the forthcoming analysis, “the press” refers to the institutional press, including
newspapers, magazines, television broadcasts, and other similar news organizations.
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nation’s history has made one thing explicitly clear: a free press
was, and continues to be, crucial to the success of a democracy.7
Often referred to more colloquially as the Fourth Estate,
the traditional press is an impartial body responsible for
informing the public; it is the institution that must serve as a
check on the three branches of government.8 The press must
therefore be free “to gather news, write it, publish it, and
circulate it.”9 No step of the journalistic process is more
important than another, so preserving this “full and free flow of
information to the general public has long been recognized as a
core objective of the First Amendment.”10
It is particularly unsettling, then, that the First
Amendment ultimately affords the press varying levels of legal
protection.11 Take, for example, a newspaper’s right to publish
content compared to its right to gather valuable information. As
is axiomatic, a citizen (here, a journalist) has the right to speak
free of censorship.12 The Supreme Court has even held that
government censorship of a news publication, also referred to as
prior restraint, is presumptively unconstitutional.13 Even though
the Court has made clear that journalists are not necessarily
entitled to a special status under the rule of law, it has found ways
to treat reporters with a certain reverence, particularly in cases
where it confronts prior restraints.14 On the other hand, courts
are not at all decisive when it comes to newsgathering itself,
7 LIDSKY & WRIGHT, supra note 4, at 8. See, e.g., Near v. Minnesota ex rel.
Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 719–20 (1931) (ruling in favor of a media organization on the
grounds that society needs “a vigilant and courageous press”); Grosjean v. Am. Press Co.,
297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936) (“A free press stands as one of the great interpreters between
the government and the people. To allow it to be fettered is to fetter ourselves.”); Estes
v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 539 (1965) (“The free press has been a mighty catalyst in
awakening public interest in governmental affairs . . . .”); S. Rep. No. 113–118, at 3
(2013) (“A free press is vital to a healthy democracy, and a journalist’s ability to
effectively gather information is, in turn, central to a free press.”).
8 Potter Stewart, Or of the Press, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 633–34 (1975). For a
more detailed account of the origin of the Fourth Estate, see THOMAS CARLYLE, ON
HEROES, HERO-WORSHIP, & THE HEROIC IN HISTORY 257–58 (4th ed., 1852) (“Burke said
there were Three Estates in Parliament; but, in the Reporters’ Gallery yonder, there sat
a Fourth Estate more important far than they all. It is not a figure of speech, or a witty
saying; it is a literal fact . . . . Whoever can speak, speaking now to the whole nation,
becomes a power, a branch of government, with inalienable weight in law-making, in all
acts of authority.” (emphasis in original)).
9 In re Mack, 126 A.2d 679, 689 (Pa. 1956) (Musmanno, J., dissenting) (noting
that when the press cannot carry out one of its fundamental operations, “freedom of the
press becomes a river without water”).
10 Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 30 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
11 See infra Sections I.A–C.
12 New York Times Co. v. United States (The Pentagon Papers), 403 U.S. 713,
717 (1971).
13 See infra Part IV.
14 See infra Section I.A.
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making it difficult for a reporter to even access critical
information in the first place, let alone keep it confidential.15
Arguably the least protected—and most complicated—
aspect of the journalistic process is a reporter’s relationship with
her source.16 Members of the press often face subpoenas or
similar court orders, compelling the disclosure of a source’s
identity, and journalists have relied on the First Amendment as
a defense.17 For decades, journalists have responded by asserting
a “reporter’s privilege,” a testimonial privilege similar to that of
a physician or an attorney.18 Journalists argue that refusing to
comply with a subpoena or court order is well within the
constitutional protection afforded by the First Amendment.19
Today, the recognition of a reporter’s privilege is far from
well-settled law.20 Not a single jurisdiction—across both the
state and federal levels—approaches the privilege analysis the
same way,21 and the doctrine has evolved in a way that is
“uniformly regarded as confusing, resulting in a privilege that is
ambiguous, inconsistent, and the subject of significant
criticism.”22 While practically all state jurisdictions recognize at
least a qualified privilege for the press, there exists no such
privilege at the federal level.23 The Supreme Court has only
heard one reporter’s privilege case;24 denying petitions for
certiorari in all other similar instances.25
A number of high-profile cases on the privilege issue
made headlines in 2005, followed shortly thereafter by an

See infra Section I.A.
RonNell Andersen Jones, Rethinking Reporter’s Privilege, 111 MICH. L. REV.
1221, 1223–25 (2013).
17 See id. at 1224–25.
18 Id. at 1223–24.
19 See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 667 (1972).
20 See infra Parts II, III.
21 See infra Section II.A.
22 Jones, supra note 16, at 1225 (footnotes omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
23 See infra Section II.A.
24 See generally Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (refusing to
acknowledge the existence of a privilege for reporters at a federal level).
25 See Garland v. Torre, 259 F. 2d 545 (2d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958);
Baker v. F & F Inv., 470 F. 2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 966 (1973);
Cervantes v. Time, Inc., 464 F. 2d 986 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1125 (1973);
Farr v. Pitchess, 522 F. 2d 464 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976); Miller
v. Transamerican Press, 621 F. 2d 721 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1041 (1981);
LaRouche v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 780 F.2d 1134 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 818
(1986); Wen Ho Lee v. Dep’t of Justice, 413 F. 3d 53 (D.C. Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 547
U.S. 1187 (2006); In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 397 F. 3d 964 (D.C. Cir.
2005), cert. denied sub nom. Cooper v. United States, 545 U.S. 1150 (2005), opinion
superseded, 438 F. 3d 1141 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
15
16

704

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83:2

outpouring of subpoenas being issued upon the press.26 And as a
result of the “‘varying privilege protections available in different
jurisdictions as well as the unpredictable outcomes when judges
engage in ad hoc balancing’ create[ing] uncertainty for both sources
and journalists,”27 reporters now fear that sources will stop coming
forward with information integral to the free flow of information.
Absent a framework in which members of the press can
consistently protect their confidential information, sources will
stop disclosing valuable information for fear of legal punishment,
leaving journalists with less accurate and less timely facts from
which to report to the public.28 The ambiguities at a federal level
have significantly burdened the newsgathering process and
effectively censored the press, which is entirely inconsistent with
the First Amendment.29
Part I of this note offers a brief overview of First
Amendment jurisprudence as it applies to the press. Part II
focuses on the development of reporter’s privilege. This Part
argues that federal law must permit journalists to protect their
sources, as it is not only demanded by decades of First
Amendment case law, but absolutely necessary in today’s legal
and political landscape. Part III examines the more recent cases
that have shed light on the doctrinal inconsistencies at the
federal level. Part IV then proposes a solution: the federal
judiciary must begin analyzing media subpoenas—the very tools
that continue to strip the press of their sources—as prior
restraints. If courts apply the prior restraint balancing test,
which permits censorship only under extremely compelling
circumstances, the federal judiciary can accommodate the
interests of the government without silencing the press.

26 Victor Kovner, Panel Discussion, Are Journalists Privileged?, 29 CARDOZO
L. REV. 1353, 1365 (2008) (“Prosecutors will feel, because of the notoriety of the Miller
case, that they are not doing their job effectively unless they subpoena the press. This
has virtually turned the relationship on its head.”).
27 William E. Lee, A Revisionist View of Journalist’s Privilege: Justice Powell,
Branzburg and the “Proper Balance,” 34 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 113, 160 (2016)
(quoting William E. Lee, The Priestly Class: Reflections on a Journalist’s Privilege, 23
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 635, 664–65 (2006)).
28 Jonathan Peters, Shield Laws and Journalist’s Privilege: The Basics Every
Reporter Should Know, COLUM. JOURNALISM R. (Aug. 21, 2016), http://www.cjr.org/united_
states_project/journalists_privilege_shield_law_primer.php [https://perma.cc/7BFF-YCBB].
29 See generally RonNell Andersen Jones, Media Subpoenas: Impact,
Perception, and Legal Protection in the Changing World of American Journalism, 84
WASH. L. REV. 317 (2009) (reporting the results of a large-scale empirical study which
presented the quantitative and qualitative effects that subpoenas have on the news
media press).
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I.

THE PRESS’ FIRST AMENDMENT: A FULL AND FREE FLOW
OF INFORMATION

A.

A Full and Free Right of Access

Generally, the Supreme Court has held that the public has a
right to access information and ideas. In Red Lion Broadcasting Co.
v. FCC, for example, the Court held that “[i]t is the right of the public
to receive suitable access to” information that is newsworthy and
crucial.30 The Court reaffirmed this rule when it decided Stanley v.
Georgia: “[t]his right to receive information and ideas, regardless of
their social worth, is fundamental to our free society.”31
While it has also addressed the First Amendment right
of access specifically as it relates to the press, the Court largely
maintains the position that all information open to the general
public is equally open to the press.32 Rightly so, as inhibiting the
publication of information that should reach the public is
inconsistent with well-established First Amendment precedent.
The press must report on issues of public concern, “whatever the
source, without censorship, injunctions, or prior restraint.”33 If
the First Amendment does truly protect the free flow of
information, then failing to provide federal protection to the
journalist-source relationship halts the necessary flow of
information to the public. This argument is further supported by
the Court’s stance on the presumptive unconstitutionality of
government censorship.34
B.

Flow: Publishing Free of Censorship

A citizen’s right to speak free of censorship is the true
foundation to the First Amendment. It is the most basic right,
and the Supreme Court has unequivocally held that prior
restraints—a government action or regulation that restricts
speech in advance of its publication—is “the most serious and
the least tolerable infringement on First Amendment rights.”35

30
31
32
33
34
35

Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969).
Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 598–601 (1980).
The Pentagon Papers, 403 U.S. 713, 717 (1971).
Id. at 714.
Nebraska Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976).
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1. Near v. Minnesota
The Supreme Court first addressed prior restraints in
1931.36 The case, Near v. Minnesota, dealt with the publishing of a
pamphlet-like newspaper that targeted local Minneapolis officials
and their alleged wrongdoings.37 The trial court immediately banned
further publication, relying on a Minnesota law which restricted the
publication of “malicious, scandalous and defamatory” newspapers
without official approval from the state government.38 On appeal to
the Supreme Court, the newspaper argued that the state violated
the publisher’s First Amendment rights by prohibiting the
publication of the allegedly defamatory newspaper.39
In this landmark case for press freedoms, the Court held
that the government may not prohibit a publication in advance.40
Focusing primarily on the First Amendment’s rich history—
namely the Framers’ deliberate protection against government
censorship—the Court determined that the Minnesota law
constituted a system of prior restraint.41 In an attempt to further
elucidate the prior restraint doctrine, the Court majority wrote
that “[t]he exceptional nature of its limitations places in a strong
light the general conception that liberty of the press, historically
considered and taken up by the Federal Constitution, has
meant, principally although not exclusively, immunity from
previous restraints or censorship.”42
The Court also noted the difference between censorship
and punishment: subsequent punishment for a criminally libelous
article could be permissible under other First Amendment
doctrines, but a statute that allowed for an injunction to halt
publication before the potentially criminal words are spoken was
wholly inconsistent with the Constitution.43 Even though the Court
noted that there might exist circumstances where prior restraints
could be acceptable (notably, where national security is at risk), the
Near decision was a resounding win for the press: the government
could not prevent a newspaper from publishing its content.

36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43

See Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
Id. at 701–03.
Id. at 701–02.
See id. at 705–07.
Id. at 722–23.
See id. at 712–22 (holding that the Minnesota state law was “effective censorship”).
Id. at 716.
Id. at 715.

2018]

WHEN THE FOURTH ESTATE’S WELL RUNS DRY

707

2. The Pentagon Papers
The Supreme Court did not again confront the issue of
government censorship on such a large scale until forty years later.
On June 13, 1971, the front page of the New York Times read:
“VIETNAM ARCHIVE: PENTAGON TRACES 3 DECADES OF
GROWING U.S. INVOLVEMENT.”44 Over the next two days, the
Times published a series of classified documents detailing American
involvement in Vietnam.45 These documents soon became known as
the Pentagon Papers.46 Upon their release, the Nixon administration
immediately filed suit in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York against the Times and moved for a
restraining order to prevent any further publication of the classified
material.47 The government claimed that the publication of these
confidential documents would cause irreparable injury to the
country, the security of its citizens and its relationships overseas.48
The district court ruled in the government’s favor, enabling it to file
for a restraining order against the Times.49
Meanwhile, the Washington Post received a copy of the
Pentagon Papers.50 The Post released its own installment of the
documents on June 18 of that year, the Boston Globe, Chicago
Sun-Times, and thirteen other newspapers followed suit.51
Though the federal government did successfully file an
injunction against the Post days later, the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia’s dissent gave the press hope, with an
opinion that reaffirmed the long-standing notion that any
restraint on publication is a “cut [to] the heart of our free
institutions and system of government.”52 The dissent opened
with firm disagreement:

44 Neil Sheehan, Vietnam Archive: Pentagon Study Traces 3 Decades of Growing
U. S. Involvement, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 1971, at 1, col. 1, http://www.nytimes.com/1971/06/
13/archives/vietnam-archive-pentagon-study-traces-3-decades-of-growing-u-s.html [https://
perma.cc/Y79T-CNKG].
45 See United States v. New York Times, 328 F. Supp. 324, 325–26 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
46 For the full and archived coverage of “The Pentagon Papers,” see Pentagon
Papers, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/topic/subject/pentagon-papers [https://
perma.cc/5CBC-6RBX].
47 New York Times, 328 F. Supp. at 326.
48 Id.
49 Id. at 325.
50 John T. Correll, The Pentagon Papers, AIR FORCE MAG. (Feb. 2007), http://
www.airforcemag.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/2007/February%202007/0207pentagon.aspx
[https://perma.cc/HG8B-LA58].
51 Id.
52 Notes and Comments, The Purloined Pentagon Papers and Prior Restraint:
The Press Prevailed!, 46 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 81, 84 (2012). See United States v.
Washington Post Co., 446 F.2d 1322, 1325 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (Wright, J. dissenting).
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This is a sad day for America. Today, for the first time in the two hundred
years of our history, the executive department has succeeded in stopping
the presses. It has enlisted the judiciary in the suppression of our most
precious freedom. As if the long and sordid war in Southeast Asia had not
already done enough harm to our people, it now is used to cut out the
heart of our free institutions and system of government.53

For the first time in over a decade, the Supreme Court
extended its term to hear the case. On June 30, 1971, the Court
reversed both injunctions issued upon both the Times and the
Post, holding that prior restraints were unconstitutional absent
a particularized showing of harm to national security.54 The
unsigned, per curium opinion ruled in favor of the press, noting,
of course, that history indicates a “heavy presumption” against
government censorship.55 Prior restraints, the Court stressed,
could only be imposed where the speech the government sought
to suppress would cause “grave and irreparable danger.”56
The press had not only won the battle over The Pentagon
Papers, but the war against government censorship. In the years
that followed, the Court continued to rule in favor of the press
on matters of censorship and prior restraint.
3. Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart
Only a few years later, the Supreme Court handed down a
decision that further developed the scope of the prior restraint
doctrine.57 Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, a case which arose
from the press’ coverage of the brutal killing of an entire family in
Sutherland, Nebraska, addressed whether the government could
prevent members of the media from publishing information
gathered during criminal proceedings.58
The defendant’s arrest sparked media interest in both the
local and national arenas, leading both the local county attorney
and the defense attorney to enter into a court order to restrict the
press from further covering the trial; both parties argued that the
“reasonable likelihood of prejudicial news . . . would make difficult,
if not impossible, the impaneling of an impartial jury and tend to
prevent a fair trial.”59 The state trial judge granted the order,
completely chilling any subsequent coverage of the criminal trial.60
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

Washington Post Co., 446 F.2d at 1325 (Wright, J. dissenting).
The Pentagon Papers, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971).
Id. at 723 (quoting Org. for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971)).
Id. at 732.
See Nebraska Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
Id. at 540–42.
Id. at 559.
Id. at 542–48.
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The Supreme Court heard the case in 1976 and
ultimately sided with the press.61 While much of the opinion
simply reaffirmed the same ideals used to support its holdings
in Near and New York Times, the Court held that “the damage
can be particularly great when the prior restraint falls upon the
communication of news and commentary on current events.”62
Notably citing to one of its own decisions deciding a separate
First Amendment matter, the Court stated that “[r]egardless of
how beneficent-sounding the purposes of controlling the press
might be, [the Court] . . . remain[s] intensely skeptical about
those measures that would allow government to insinuate itself
into the editorial rooms of this [n]ation’s press.”63
C.

The Press’ Well of Information

Journalists have been protecting confidential information
gathered during the pre-publication process since the early days of
the printing press,64 but it was not until 1972 that the Supreme
Court addressed whether a journalist could invoke the First
Amendment to protect himself and his source from a grand jury
subpoena.65 The Court had previously declined to hear the issue in
an earlier case, where an entertainment reporter for the New York
Herald Tribune was the first to assert a reporter’s privilege in
federal court.66

61 Id. at 570 (“We hold that, with respect to the order entered in this case
prohibiting reporting or commentary on judicial proceedings held in public, the barriers
have not been overcome; to the extent that this order restrained publication of such
material, it is clearly invalid.”).
62 Id. at 529–62 (“A responsible press has always been regarded as the
handmaiden of effective judicial administration, especially in the criminal field. Its
function in this regard is documented by an impressive record of service over several
centuries. The press does not simply publish information about trials but guards against
the miscarriage of justice by subjecting the police, prosecutors, and judicial processes to
extensive public scrutiny and criticism.”).
63 Id. at 560–61 (quoting Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S.
241, 259 (1974) (White, J., concurring)).
64 See POWE, supra note 2, at 7–13.
65 See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
66 Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545, 547 (2d Cir. 1958). Marie Torre had written
a column in the Tribune about Judy Garland, in which Torre quoted an anonymous CBS
executive. Id. Garland, unhappy with the coverage, sued the television network,
demanding that Torre disclose the name of her source. Id. Torre invoked her First
Amendment right to protect the source’s identity, asserting that compelling disclosure of
the source’s identity would “impose an important practical restraint on the flow of news
from news sources to the news media and would thus diminish pro tanto the flow of news
to the public.” Id. at 547–48. Torre protected the identity of her source until her death in
1997. Nick Ravo, Marie Torre, 72, TV Columnist Jailed for Protecting News Source, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 5, 1997), http://www.nytimes.com/1997/01/05/nyregion/marie-torre-72-tvcolumnist-jailed-for-protecting-news-source.html [https://perma.cc/VUF4-65RG].

710

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83:2

Branzburg v. Hayes is the consolidation of three cases in
which the Court first evaluated this issue.67 Three individual
reporters had been issued separate grand jury subpoenas,
compelling them each to reveal their sources in connection with
their respective reporting on the Black Panther Party.68
The journalists refused to appear before grand juries, and
argued that the First Amendment afforded them the right to protect
their confidential sources and the information that those sources
had disclosed.69 The three reporters also claimed that requiring a
member of the press to disclose any confidential information would
place a severe, distinct burden on newsgathering, which would
undoubtedly outweigh any public interest in the information that
could potentially assist in the criminal justice process.70
In a plurality opinion written by Justice White, the Court
denied the existence of a reporter’s privilege in any capacity, and
effectively rejected the reporters’ argument that the First
Amendment could protect the press from a subpoena or a similar
court order.71 Essentially, the Court held that journalists could
not circumvent their legal obligation to respond to grand jury
subpoenas simply because of a job title.72 Justice White’s opinion
categorically rejected the notion that the First Amendment or
any other constitutional privilege exists to protect the press from
a subpoena or a similar court order.73
It was Justice Powell’s concurrence, though, that
ultimately breathed life into the reporters’ First Amendment
arguments;74 his opinion set forth the framework that many
jurisdictions now use for providing its journalists with some kind
of protection.75 Though Justice Powell noted the “limited nature”
of the Court’s opinion, the concurrence seemed to plainly contradict
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 667 (1972).
Id. at 668, 672–73, 675.
69 Id. at 668, 673, 676.
70 Id. at 676.
71 Id. at 689–704.
72 Id. at 697.
73 See Paul Marcus, The Reporter’s Privilege: An Analysis of the Common Law,
Branzburg v. Hayes, and Recent Statutory Developments, 25 ARIZ. L. REV. 815, 823 (1983)
(“Strangely, Justice White either misconstrued the reporters’ position, or chose to
interpret it as encompassing an assertion of absolute privilege . . . The reporters’
argument, though, was straightforward and hardly advocated an absolute privilege.”)
74 See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 709–10 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring).
75 Michele Bush Kimball, The Intent Behind the Cryptic Concurrence That
Provided a Reporter’s Privilege, 13 COMM. L. & POL’Y 379, 379–80 (2008). Though the
concurring opinion was a brief one, academics, attorneys, and judges alike have analyzed
the meaning of Justice Powell’s intent in writing separately, as well as the implications
his concurrence had on the Court’s decision as a whole. See, e.g., Lee, supra note 27, at
115–20; Sean W. Kelly, Black and White and Read All Over: Press Protection After
Branzburg, 57 DUKE L.J. 199, 208–10 (2007).
67
68
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the majority’s ruling.76 Justice Powell wrote that the Court’s
decision did not mean “that newsmen . . . [were] without
constitutional rights with respect to the gathering of news or in
safeguarding their sources,” or that government authorities would
be permitted to “annex” the press “as ‘an investigative arm of
government.’”77 He insisted that the news media must still have
remedies for safeguarding its sources.78 His concurrence suggested
that issues like the one before the Court called for a fact-specific
test that should strike a balance between press freedom and a
citizen’s duty to testify regarding criminal conduct when under
court order.79 He reasoned that such a case-by-case balancing
approach would be consistent “with the tried and traditional way
of adjudicating such questions.”80
Justices Stewart and Douglas wrote separate dissenting
opinions. In his, Justice Stewart suggested the implementation
of a separate three-prong balancing test to determine whether a
journalist could qualify for this special privilege.81 The proposed
judicial analysis would impose a particularly heavy burden on
the government to:
(1) show that there is probable cause to believe that the [reporter]
has information that is clearly relevant to a specific probable
violation of law; (2) demonstrate that the information sought cannot
be obtained by alternative means less destructive of First
Amendment rights; and (3) demonstrate a compelling and overriding
interest in the information.82

Notably, Justice Stewart recognized the existence of a
reporter’s privilege and expressed concern about the very issue
that this note seeks to address: if the Court were to establish
that there was no privilege, then sources with useful information
would refuse to share that information with the press.83 Justice
Douglas echoed these concerns, concluding in his dissent that by
refusing to acknowledge a reporter’s privilege, the Court
deprived—and will continue to deprive—the public of its right to
a free flow of information.84 According to Justice Douglas, a
76 See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 709–10 (Powell, J., concurring). During his
tenure on the Supreme Court, Justice Powell never approved of writing a concurring or
dissenting opinion solely for the purpose of supplementing a majority opinion. Kimball,
supra 75, at 405. During an interview, years after the Branzburg decision, one of Justice
Powell’s law clerks stated that “[w]hen [Justice Powell] chose to write something . . . he
did it because he thought it was important.” Id.
77 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 709 (Powell, J., concurring).
78 Id. at 709–10.
79 Id. at 710.
80 Id.
81 Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 743 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
82 Id.
83 Id. at 731.
84 Id.at 723 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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fervent, long-time supporter of the First Amendment and the
rights accompanying it, “all of the ‘balancing’ was done by those
who wrote the Bill of Rights.”85
Even though the journalists did not prevail on the
constitutional front in 1972, Justice Powell’s concurrence actually
opened the door to a federal reporter’s privilege, and “the battle
over the right of journalists to protect their confidential sources has
raged ever since on a number of fronts.”86
II.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE REPORTER’S PRIVILEGE

A.

Lower Courts Respond to Branzburg

In the immediate wake of Branzburg, dozens of reporters
were cited for contempt and many jailed for refusing to comply
with government subpoenas.87 States eventually began to react.
Some legislatures implemented “shield laws” to codify a press
privilege into their jurisdictional framework,88 while other
states’ courts acknowledged a protection akin to the limited
privilege proposed by the Branzburg dissent.89 Today, forty-nine
states and the District of Columbia recognize some kind of
reporter’s privilege, whether by statute or by court decision.90
Even though the state protections vary in scope,91 the almost
unanimous acknowledgement of a reporter’s privilege at the
state level further supports the argument that the First
Amendment should extend to a reporter’s privilege.
Beyond state courts, federal circuit courts began to
interpret Branzburg in an inconsistent manner. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth and Seventh Circuits, on
one hand, immediately rejected Justice Powell’s concurrence and
Id. at 713.
Joel M. Gora, The Source of the Problem of Sources: The First Amendment
Fails the Fourth Estate, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1399, 1404 (2008).
87 David K. Shipler, 30 Cases Cited in Which Police or Courts Allegedly Threatened
Free Press, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 18, 1973), http://www.nytimes.com/1973/02/18/archives/30-casescited-in-which-police-or-courts-allegedly-threatened-free.html [https://perma.cc/QJY3-927F].
88 See, e.g., N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 79-h (McKinney 1990) (creating an
absolute privilege to refuse disclosure of confidential sources and information, but
allowing for disclosure of non-confidential information in certain circumstances); D.C. CODE
§ 16-4702 (1995); D.C. CODE § 16-4703 (1992) (recognizing an absolute privilege against
compelled disclosure of sources and a qualified privilege against compelled disclosure of
information ascertained during an investigation); FLA. STAT. § 90.5015 (1998) (granting
reporters a qualified privilege in connection with “actively gathering news”).
89 State-By-State Guide to the Reporter’s Privilege for Student Media, STUDENT
PRESS LAW CTR., http://www.splc.org/article/2010/09/state-by-state-guide-to-the-reportersprivilege-for-student-media?id=60 [https://perma.cc/D87C-7PED].
90 Id. At the time of this writing, the only state that does not acknowledge any
reporter’s privilege is Wyoming.
91 See supra notes 9–12 and accompanying text.
85
86
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the existence of a reporter’s privilege.92 Other circuits looked
only to Justice Powell’s concurrence to develop their own
separate and distinct judicial balancing tests for deciding
whether a member of the news media must reveal a source.93
Take the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit, for example. It recognizes a narrow qualified privilege,
insisting that there must be evidence of “governmental harassment
or bad faith” before the press can successfully invoke a reporter’s
privilege.94 Implementing a different approach, the Ninth Circuit
has utilized a balancing test that lends itself to a relatively broad
qualified privilege: “the process of deciding whether the privilege is
overcome requires that ‘the claimed First Amendment privilege and
the opposing need for disclosure be judicially weighed in light of the
surrounding facts, and a balance struck to determine where lies the
paramount interest.’”95 The United States Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit, using yet another analysis, applies a “constitutionally
sensitized balancing process” to subpoenas issued upon the press,
holding that “[w]hether or not the process of taking First
Amendment concerns into consideration can be said to represent
recognition by the Court of a ‘conditional[ ] ’ or ‘limited’ privilege
is . . . largely a question of semantics.”96
Despite the doctrinal inconsistencies running throughout
federal circuit courts, protections did exist to some degree,
allowing members of the press to rely on a qualified reporter’s

92 See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Educ. V. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 481 F.3d 936, 938
(7th Cir. 2007) (holding that there need not be special criteria merely because the holder of
the documents or other information is a journalist); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 810 F.2d
580, 584 (6th Cir. 1987) (noting that if the court were to accept the existence of a reporter’s
privilege, it would squarely be agreeing with the Branzburg dissent).
93 See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 135 F.3d 963, 968–69 (5th Cir. 1998)
(relying on Justice Powell’s opinion in Branzburg to establish a balancing test that
applies only in the civil context); United States v. LaRouche Campaign, 841 F.2d 1176,
1181–82 (1st Cir. 1988) (implementing a judicial balancing test that weighs the
demanding party’s need for the information against the reporter’s First Amendment
interests); Coughlin v. Westinghouse Broad. & Cable Inc., 780 F.2d 340, 350 & n.14 (3d
Cir. 1985) (holding that privilege inquiries are best handled on a case-by-case basis,
which is “precisely the course” Justice Powell instructed that lower courts take).
94 See, e.g., United States v. King, 194 F.R.D. 569, 583 (E.D. Va. 2000) (quoting
In re Shain, 978 F.2d 850, 852 (4th Cir. 1992)); see also United States v. Lindh, 210 F.
Supp. 2d 780, 783 (E.D. Va. 2002).
95 Crowe v. Cty of San Diego, 242 F. Supp. 2d 740, 750 (S.D. Cal. 2003) (quoting
Shoen v. Shoen, 5 F.3d 1289, 1292–93 (9th Cir. 1993)).
96 Bruno & Stillman, Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co., 633 F.2d 583, 595 & n.13
(1st Cir. 1980) (“[T]he possibility that the unlimited or unthinking allowance of such
requests will impinge upon First Amendment rights.”).
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privilege in most jurisdictions to protect their sources.97 This
protection has eroded in recent years.98
B.

Attempts to Pass a Federal Shield Law

While state and circuit court decisions began confronting
the privilege issue, Congress also tried to step in to clarify the
Court’s decision in Branzburg by proposing a federal shield law.99
These early efforts were unsuccessful, though, foreshadowing a
number of failed attempts to pass federal legislation intended to
protect journalists and their sources.100
Foundational issues hampered Congress’s progress. First,
how could legislators clearly define the scope of a federal shield law
without a legal definition of a journalist?101 Second, and perhaps
more pertinent to this current analysis, how would such a law
account for the governmental interest in national security?102
When prosecutors subpoena a member of the press in
connection with a criminal investigation, the government often
argues that the journalist’s testimony is necessary for purposes
of national security.103 Some scholars suggest that the legislature
could simply carve a national security exception into the federal
shield law, meaning that reporters would have to testify if a
judge determined that the information was necessary to protect
against a threat to national security.104 But the issue with such
97 Gora, supra note 86, at 1406 (“One could accurately say that the press had
lost the battle in Branzburg, but won the war in three decades of lower court rulings
giving a narrow interpretation to that ruling and finding broad room for First
Amendment protection of confidential sources.”).
98 See infra Part III.
99 See Newsmen’s Privilege: Hearings on H.R. 837 and H.R. 1084 Before the
Subcom. No 3, H. Comm. On the Judiciary, 92nd Cong. 1 (1972).
100 Anthony Lewis, Panel Discussion, Are Journalists Privileged?, 29 CARDOZO
L. REV. 1353, 1356, 1361 (2008) (arguing that one of the difficulties in drafting and
passing a federal shield law is the government’s compelling interest of national security).
See S. 987, 113th Cong. (2013); H.R. 1962, 113th Cong. (2013); H.R. 2932, 112th Cong.
(2011); H.R. 985, 111th Cong. (2009); S. 448, 111th Cong. (2009).
101 Gora, supra note 86, at 1399. The bill proposed by the House of Representatives
in 2007 provided a definition for the type of person entitled to a qualified privilege: a “covered
person” is one who “regularly . . . publishes news or information . . . for dissemination to the
public for a substantial portion of the person’s livelihood or for substantial financial gain.”
H.R. 2102, 110th Cong. § 4(2) (2007). Years later, the 2013 Senate bill defined “covered
person” differently, as a person who, “with the primary intent to investigate events and
procure material in order to disseminate to the public news . . . or matters of public interest,
regularly gathers, prepares, collects, photographs, records, writes, edits, reports or publishes
on such matters . . . .” S. 987, 113th Cong. (2013).
102 Gora, supra note 86, at 1416.
103 Lewis, supra note 100, at 1357 (arguing that one of the difficulties in
drafting and passing a federal shield law is the government’s compelling interest of
national security).
104 Geoffrey R. Stone, Half a Shield Is Better than None, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 21, 2007),
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/21/opinion/21stone.html [https://perma.cc/LD24-P2AY].

2018]

WHEN THE FOURTH ESTATE’S WELL RUNS DRY

715

an exception is clear: it would undermine the purpose of the shield
itself.105 History suggests that the American public relies on the
news media in times of national crisis and political unrest; press
freedom cannot be fettered in the very circumstances that reporters
are needed the most.106
In November 2017, two U.S. Senators introduced the Free
Flow of Information Act of 2017 into Congress.107 As written, the bill
would only require journalists to disclose their newsgathering
materials if the government could prove that: (1) it had exhausted
all other options for obtaining the information; (2) the information
sought by subpoena is “critical” to the matter at hand; and (3) the
“public interest in compelling disclosure of the information or
document involved outweighs the public interest in gathering or
disseminating news or information.”108 While the enactment of such
legislation would be of great benefit to the press, the current political
climate suggests that such a stringent rule will prove difficult to pass
in both the House and the Senate.
C.

Potential Federal Evidentiary Support

Notwithstanding the constitutionally-based argument,
the press has recently begun relying on the Federal Rules of
Evidence (Federal Rules) to support the existence of a reporter’s
privilege.109 Initially, Rule 501 of the Federal Rules listed nine
specific testimonial privileges that were, at the time, commonlyaccepted reasons or relationships allowing a person to refuse to
testify in a federal proceeding: (1) required reports, (2) lawyer-client,
(3) psychotherapist-patient, (4) husband-wife, (5) communications
to clergymen, (6) political vote, (7) trade secrets, (8) secrets of state
and other official information, and (9) identity of informer.110
Just three years after the Supreme Court decided
Branzburg, however, Congress rejected the use of an articulated
list of privileges and instead adopted a broad, open-ended
Lewis, supra note 100, at 1357.
Id. (“The most important press disclosures have had to do with what the
government says is national security: the Pentagon Papers case, warrantless wiretapping,
secret CIA prisons.”).
107 See H.R. 4382, 115th Cong. (2017).
108 Id.
109 See, e.g., Notice of Motion & Motion to Quash Subpoenas by Mark FainaruWada & Lance Williams; Memorandum of Points & Authorities in Support Thereof at
18, In re Grand Jury Subpoenas (Fainaru-Wada), 438 F. Supp. 2d 1111 (N.D. Cal. 2006)
(Case No. CR 06 90225), 2006 WL 1545207.
110 See FED. R. EVID. 501 advisory committee’s note to 2011 amendment for a
more in-depth discussion of testimonial privileges and the House Judiciary Committee’s
analysis of their evidentiary merit. These privileges were those that had been
acknowledged by common law, not privileges that had been at all granted by the U.S.
Constitution.
105

106
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version of Rule 501.111 Today, the rule provides that testimonial
privileges “shall be governed by the principles of the common
law . . . in the light of reason and experience. . . .”112 The rule’s
flexibility “leaves open the possibility that courts will interpret
the rule to either foreclose the development or expansion of
privileges or encourage such development or expansion.”113
Journalists that invoke Rule 501 to bolster their
arguments for a federal privilege rely almost exclusively on the
precedent established in Jaffee v. Redmond, where the Supreme
Court identified factors for federal courts to consider when
presented with the patient-therapist privilege issue.114 The
Jaffee Court urged lower courts to examine whether the
privilege promotes “sufficiently important” private and public
interests, while also assessing the evidentiary benefits of
denying the privilege.115 The Jaffee opinion also made clear that
when confronted with a new testimonial privilege that is widelyprovided for in state jurisdictions, the analysis should tip in
favor of recognizing such a privilege on a federal level.116
Considering that all but one state acknowledges the
existence of a reporter’s privilege to some extent, it would seem
that both reason and experience do, in fact, indicate that the
common law encompasses a privilege protecting the reportersource relationship. Even though the Supreme Court has failed
to decisively rule on the issue, those in favor of a press privilege
are optimistic that Rule 501 could eventually serve to mitigate
the burdens that subpoenas and court orders impose (and will
continue to impose) upon the press.117
D.

The Demise of the Department of Justice Guidelines

The Department of Justice (DOJ) even followed suit in
attempting to put limits on federal prosecutors’ taking action
against journalists.118 Reminiscent of many of the judicial
balancing tests utilized in lower courts, the DOJ’s Guidelines for
Subpoenas to the News Media (the Guidelines) required that the
government weigh any harm to First Amendment interests
111 FED. R. EVID. 501 advisory committee’s note to 2011 amendment; H.R. Rep.
No. 93-650, at 8 (1973).
112 FED. R. EVID. 501 advisory committee’s note to 2011 amendment.
113 Anthony L. Fargo & Paul McAdoo, Common Law or Shield Law? How Rule 501
Could Solve the Journalist’s Privilege Problem, 33 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1347, 1364 (2007).
114 See Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 4 (1996).
115 Id. at 11.
116 Id. at 16–17.
117 Fargo & McAdoo, supra note 113, at 1379.
118 28 C.F.R. § 50.10 (2017).
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against the government’s need for the information being asked
of the press through a subpoena or court order.119 The Guidelines
also required federal authorities to accommodate these kinds of
varied interests by negotiating with the media before they can
even issue a subpoena.120 These regulations, as originally
written, helped “form[ ] part of the protective legal culture in
which broader legal recognition . . . could occur.”121
In 2015, then Attorney General Eric Holder revised the
Guidelines in a way that would, per Holder, “strike an
appropriate balance between law enforcement’s need to protect
the American people, and the news media’s role in ensuring the
free flow of information.”122 The traditional press remained
hopeful that changes made under the Obama administration
would help protect journalists from federal subpoenas, but the
more recent rhetoric from the Trump administration has called
any such optimism into question.123
On August 4, 2017, Attorney General Jeff Sessions held
a press conference to address the DOJ’s commitment to
investigating and prosecuting any classified leaks.124 After
noting that the administration would review the policies relating
to media subpoenas, he delivered a threat to all informants:
[H]ere is what I want to tell every American today: This nation must
end the culture of leaks. We will investigate and seek to bring
criminals to justice. We will not allow rogue anonymous sources with
security clearances to sell out our country any longer . . . [C]ases will
be made, and leakers will be held accountable.125

119 See id. § 50.10(a) (“In determining whether to request issuance of a
subpoena to a member of the news media, or for telephone toll records of any member of
the news media, the approach in every case must be to strike the proper balance between
the public’s interest in the free dissemination of ideas and information and the public’s
interest in effective law enforcement and the fair administration of justice.”).
120 Id. § 50.10(c)(4)(iv)(A).
121 Gora, supra note 86, at 1404 (emphasis added).
122 Press Release, Dep’t of Just., Office of Public Affairs: Attorney General
Holder Announces Updates to Justice Department Media Guidelines (Jan. 14, 2015),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-general-holder-announces-updates-justicedepartment-media-guidelines [https://perma.cc/DN2G-H69W].
123 See Press Release, Dep’t of Just., Office of Public Affairs: Attorney General Jeff
Sessions Delivers Remarks at Briefing on Leaks of Classified Materials Threatening National
Security (Aug. 4, 2017) [hereinafter Attorney General Jeff Sessions Delivers Remarks],
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-general-jeff-sessions-delivers-remarks-briefingleaks-classified-materials [https://perma.cc/8NYZ-MUFB].
124 Id. (“No one is entitled to surreptitiously fight their battles in the media by
revealing sensitive government information. No government can be effective when its
leaders cannot discuss sensitive matters in confidence or to talk freely in confidence with
foreign leaders.”). Notably, these sweeping statements flatly contradict centuries of wellsettled First Amendment case law. See supra Part I.
125 Attorney General Jeff Sessions Delivers Remarks, supra note 123.
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Though no one from the Executive branch has addressed
the privilege issue directly since, the Trump Administration’s
general distaste for the press indicates that journalists have
some serious reason for concern.126
III.

A PROBLEMATIC PRESENT

So yes, journalists may have had some potential legal
remedies at their disposal: in the years proceeding Branzburg,
practically every state jurisdiction recognized the existence of a
press privilege and even some circuit courts showed signs of
coming around to the idea of allowing reporters to protect their
confidential sources.127 The privilege debate was reignited in
2003, though, when the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit, in an opinion authored by the renowned Judge
Richard Posner, refused to acknowledge the existence of a
reporter’s privilege in a case involving journalists’ refusal to turn
over information regarding their interview of a witness involved
in a criminal trial outside of the United States.128 There, the
press was an uninterested third party in the prosecution, yet the
Seventh Circuit still demanded the release of the interview
materials, flatly rejecting the press’ argument that Justice
Powell’s opinion provided a qualified privilege for journalists.129
McKevitt v. Pallasch did not make major news headlines, but in
just a matter of years, a landslide of other reporter’s privilege
cases did.
In 2005, a federal district court ordered that Judith Miller,
a Pulitzer-Prize winning reporter for the New York Times, reveal
the identity of one of her confidential sources.130 Miller’s compliance
with the subpoena and disclosure of her source, the government
argued, was necessary for its investigation into the unauthorized
leak of an undercover FBI agent’s identity.131 Miller refused, and
she spent eighty-five days in jail.132
126 See Joel Simon, Assessing Trump’s Press Freedom Record, One Year On, COLUM.
JOURNALISM R. (Jan. 19, 2018), https://www.cjr.org/analysis/trump-press-freedom.php [https://
perma.cc/HTE4-97U2].
127 See supra Section II.A.
128 See McKevitt v. Pallasch, 339 F.3d 530, 531–33 (7th Cir. 2003).
129 Id. at 532–33 (“[A] large number of cases conclude, rather surprisingly in
light of Branzburg, that there is a reporter’s privilege,” but “rather than speaking of
privilege, courts should simply make sure that a subpoena duces tecum directed to the
media, like any other subpoena duces tecum, is reasonable in the circumstances.”).
130 See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 438 F.3d 1141 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
131 Id. at 1142–44.
132 Id.; see also David Johnston & Douglas Jehl, Times Reporter Free From Jail; She
Will Testify, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 30, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/30/politics/timesreporter-free-from-jail-she-will-testify.html [https://perma.cc/4Q2Q-GWN2].
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In the years following the jailing of Judith Miller, subpoenas
and court orders were issued upon the press left and right. Some
subpoenas were more severe than others, and the demands on each
journalist or news organization varied in scope.133 The government
called upon journalists to give up their notes in connection with
criminal matters and lawsuits alike, even in situations where the
reporter was merely a third-party witness to an action.134
For example, Steven Hatfill, a “person of interest” in the
infamous anthrax investigation, filed a lawsuit under the
Privacy Act for defamation against the federal government.135 In
connection with his defamation claim, Hatfill subpoenaed eleven
news organizations for any information its journalists might
have in connection with his case.136 Two of the subpoenaed
reporters did not comply, and as a result they faced federal
contempt citations, and were ordered to pay extravagant fines.137
In 2008, a federal grand jury issued a subpoena to James
Risen, an investigative reporter for the New York Times.138 The
subpoena ordered Risen to disclose the identity of his source for
a particular chapter in his book, State of War.139 Risen moved to
have the subpoena quashed, invoking the reporter’s privilege.140
The government was able to establish probable cause without
Risen’s help and they arrested Jeffrey Sterling, an intelligence
official, for charges under the Espionage Act of 1917.141
For years, Risen continued to battle subpoenas
throughout Sterling’s trial.142 Irrespective of the fact that there
did exist circumstantial evidence connecting Sterling to the leak,
133 How Many Reporters Receive Subpoenas Each Year?, REPS. COMM. FOR
FREEDOM OF PRESS, https://www.rcfp.org/browse-media-law-resources/digital-journalistslegal-guide/how-many-reporters-receive-subpoenas-each [https://perma.cc/RXQ6-4STW].
134 Between 2006 and 2011, the Attorney General approved eighty-nine
government requests for media subpoenas. The subpoenas involved, among other things,
charges of extortion, private health information, insider trading, securities and wire
fraud, kidnapping, murder, threats to the President, leaks of sealed and classified grand
jury information, and the manufacture and distribution of marijuana. Id.
135 See Complaint, Hatfill v. Ashcroft, 2003 WL 23780292, at *38 (D.C. Cir.
2003) (No. 03-1793). For a more detailed discussion of Hatfill’s claim against the federal
government and against the New York Times, see Ben Battles, Terror, Tort, and the First
Amendment: Hatfill v. New York Times and Media Liability for Intentional Infliction of
Emotional Distress, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 237 (2006).
136 David Willman, Anthrax Subject Receives Payout, L.A. TIMES (June 28, 2008),
http://articles.latimes.com/2008/jun/28/nation/na-anthrax28 [https://perma.cc/6GEN-9KL6].
137 Eric Lichtblau, Reporter Held in Contempt in Anthrax Case, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 20,
2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/20/us/20anthrax.html [https://perma.cc/T4L2-M872].
138 United States v. Sterling, 818 F. Supp. 2d 945, 947 (E.D. Va. 2011).
139 Id.
140 Id.
141 Id.
142 Matt Apuzzo, Times Reporter Will Not Be Called to Testify in Leak Case, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 12, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/13/us/times-reporter-james-risenwill-not-be-called-to-testify-in-leak-case-lawyers-say.html [https://perma.cc/25G9-HFWT].
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the government continued to argue that Risen was the only
witness able to actually identify Sterling as the source of the
illegal leak.143 In a 2–1 decision, the Fourth Circuit refused to
acknowledge the existence of a First Amendment reporter’s
privilege and forced Risen to testify during Sterling’s trial.144 But
as many reporters had done in the past—and as many reporters
will surely do in the future—Risen remained firm in his position:
he would not disclose any information gathered in connection
with his pre-publication reporting efforts.145 The DOJ ultimately
chose not to jail Risen, a decision that was made at the discretion
of the attorney general.146
Most recently, military prosecutors threatened to
subpoena Oscar-winning screenwriter Mark Boal, the reporter
who had interviewed U. S. Army Sergeant Bowe Bergdahl in the
months following his repatriation.147 Boal recorded twenty-five
hours of his conversations with Sgt. Bergdahl, only a small
portion of which was ultimately broadcast in the renowned
podcast, Serial.148 The government planned to demand
disclosure of the unedited interview tapes in their entirety,
which contained both confidential and personal information that
Boal had never intended to release to the public.149
Boal immediately filed suit against the Obama
administration, seeking both declaratory and injunctive relief to
prevent the issuance of the subpoena, arguing that the First
Amendment protected him from releasing any information that he
had obtained in his capacity as a reporter.150 Shortly thereafter,
Sterling, 724 F.3d at 507.
Id. at 491.
145 Matt Apuzzo, Defiant on Witness Stand, Times Reporter Says Little, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 5, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/06/us/james-risen-in-tensetestimony-refuses-to-offer-clues-on-sources.html [https://perma.cc/N3CB-5CSK].
146 Apuzzo, supra note 142; Charlie Savage, Holder Hints Reporter May Be Spared
Jail in Leak, N.Y. TIMES (May 27, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/28/us/holder-hintsreporter-may-be-spared-jail-in-leak.html [https://perma.cc/3MZY-2XAM]. When speaking about
the DOJ’s decision not to punish Risen, Attorney General Holder stated: “As long as I’m attorney
general, no reporter who is doing his job is going to go to jail. As long as I’m attorney general,
someone who is doing their job is not going to get prosecuted.” Id.
147 Richard A. Oppel Jr., Hollywood Screenwriter Subpoenaed for Hours of
Bergdahl Tapes, N.Y. TIMES (July 21, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/22/us/
hollywood-screenwriter-subpoenaed-for-hours-of-bergdahl-tapes.html [https://perma.cc/
MAA3-5J6C].
148 Id. (“The only time the public has heard Sgt. Bowe Bergdahl explain in his
own voice why he left his base in Afghanistan . . . was on taped interviews broadcast on
the podcast.”); See Serial: Season 2 (2015–16), https://serialpodcast.org/season-two
[https://perma.cc/N4UE-RHR4].
149 Matt Reynolds, Screenwriter Settles Fight Over Bowe Bergdahl Tapes,
COURTHOUSE NEWS (Dec. 14, 2016), https://courthousenews.com/screenwriter-settlesfight-over-bowe-bergdahl-tapes/ [https://perma.cc/73N4-KRWG].
150 Complaint, Mark Boal v. United States, No. 16-05407 (Cal. Ct. App., July
29, 2016).
143
144
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thirty-six of the country’s most prominent news organizations filed
an amicus brief in support of Boal.151 As had been argued by
journalists many times before, the press maintained that a
subpoena like the government had considered issuing upon Boal
would completely rid him of his First Amendment right to
newsgathering.152 The subpoena, as contemplated, would
“negatively affect [a reporter’s] ability to report future news stories,
and the public’s corresponding ability to receive information.”153
The judge ultimately refused to rule on the issue, relying
primarily on an opinion that the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit had recently handed down
relating to civilian courts’ interference with military courts.154
The parties eventually settled the case, and Boal was able to
protect the tapes.155
IV.

APPLYING A PRIOR RESTRAINT ANALYSIS TO MEDIA
SUBPOENAS: A PROPOSED ANALYSIS

In an editorial written during the unfolding of Judith
Miller’s case, Max Frankel, the Executive Editor of The New
York Times wrote:
So there I sat, watching the United States government in all its majesty
dragging into court the American press (in all its piety), forcing
reporters to betray confidences, rifling their files and notebooks, making
them swear to their confused memories and motives and burdening
their bosses with hefty legal fees—all for the high-sounding purpose,
yet again, of protecting our nation’s secrets.156

The failure to clarify the murky water of reporter’s privilege
at the federal level has left the press completely vulnerable and
completely open to attack. Sources will stop coming forward, the
151 See Brief for Plaintiffs as Amicus Curiae, Mark Boal v. United States of
America, No. 16-05407 (Cal. Ct. App., July 29, 2016).
152 Id. at 19–20 (citing to both Ninth Circuit and Supreme Court decisions to
argue that “[t]he loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time,
unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury”).
153 Id. at 6.
154 Ashley Cullins, Judge Urges Mark Boal and U.S. Government to “Informally”
Resolve Bergdahl Tapes Dispute, THE HOLLYWOOD REPORTER (Sept. 12, 2016), https://
www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-esq/judge-urges-mark-boal-us-927925 [https://perma.cc/
C5J3-RC42].
155 Dan Lamothe, Filmmaker Behind Bowe Bergdahl’s ‘Serial’ Interviews Settles
Lawsuit, Avoids Army Subpoena, WASH. POST (Dec. 13, 2016), https://www.washington
post.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2016/12/13/filmmaker-behind-bowe-bergdahls-serialinterviews-settles-lawsuit-with-army-avoids-subpoena/?utm_term=.1c8032ac8972 [https://
perma.cc/SSD8-KJEH].
156 Max Frankel, The Washington Back Channel, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Mar. 25,
2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/25/magazine/25Libby.t.html [https://perma.cc/
45A5-PYV5].
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production of our news will become inaccurate, and the general
public will stop putting its trust in the press, making it impossible
for the press to fulfill its role as the Fourth Estate.
A.

The Analysis

By issuing media subpoenas, the government has
effectively censored the press—the exact type of censorship that
the Supreme Court held presumptively unconstitutional over
eight decades ago in Near v. Minnesota and more plainly
reaffirmed in New York Times v. Unites States and Nebraska
Press Association v. Stuart.157
Importantly, in Nebraska Press Association, the Supreme
Court examined whether “the gravity of the ‘evil,’ discounted by its
improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary
to avoid the danger.”158 To do so, it articulated a three-part
analytical framework, which imposed a heavy burden on the party
seeking to restrain the press (most frequently, the government).159
The Court held that government censorship demanded weighing
the following factors: (1) the extent of the pretrial news coverage,
(2) whether other less restrictive measures would have alleviated
the effects of pretrial publicity, and (3) the restraining order’s
effectiveness in preventing the threatened danger.160
Federal courts utilize this judicial balancing when faced
with issues of government censorship, indicating that prior
restraints can only be issued in the most extreme of
circumstances. And when it decided the Pentagon Papers case,
the Court even noted that, in cases where the government
interest at issue was one of national security, a prior restraint
would still very rarely survive judicial scrutiny.161
B.

The Proposal

In the midst of the prosecution against him, subpoenaed
reporter James Risen wrote in his affidavit: “If I aided the
Government in its effort to prosecute my confidential sources for
providing information to me under confidentiality, I would
inevitably be compromising my own ability to gather news in the

See Section I.B.
Id. (quoting United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950)
(Learned Hand, J.)).
159 Nebraska Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 562 (1976).
160 Id.
161 The Pentagon Papers, 403 U.S. 713, 726–27 (1971).
157
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future.”162 These sentiments are shared by many journalists,
again illuminating the grave negative impact that media
subpoenas and court orders have had—and will continue to
have—upon the press. The only way for federal courts to
rehabilitate the press from years of this messy, convoluted
jurisprudence is to apply a more appropriate balancing test.
Though it is possible for such tests to be favorable to the
press, such outcomes cannot be consistent under balancing tests
that require judges to balance the interests of the reporter and the
interests of the justice system. Applying the balancing test used in
the prior restraint analysis would satisfy both the government’s oftexpressed concern of national security and the press’ interest in
promoting the free flow of information. The prior restraint analysis
does not mirror other judicial balancing tests that require a judge to
weigh the importance of societal issues against the interests of the
government.163 Instead, the prior restraint balancing test focuses
primarily on the government’s administration of censorship, the
methods by which the censorship is enforced, and the effect that the
censorship has on the ideals at the heart of the First Amendment.164
CONCLUSION
“If we don’t fight for the First Amendment, who will?”165
Toni Locy, former reporter for USA Today
Now more than ever, our press is under fire.166 In the
wake of an historic presidential election and the tumultuous

162 United States v. Sterling, 818 F. Supp. 2d 945, 954 (E.D. Va. 2011) (quoting
the affidavit of James Risen).
163 Thomas I. Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 648 (1955).
164 Id.
165 Aimee Edmondson, Toni Locy Keynote, NAT’L FREEDOM OF INFO. COAL.,
https://www.nfoic.org/toni-locy-keynote [https://perma.cc/UUQ5-V4C2]. Toni Locy was
one of the reporters ordered to reveal the identities of her confidential sources in
connection with a privacy lawsuit resulting from the government’s investigation into the
anthrax attacks of 2001. See Lichtblau, supra note 137. Locy refused to name her
sources, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit ordered that
she personally pay up to $5,000 per day until her next court appearance. Clark Hoyt,
Squeezed by the Courts, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 20, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/20/
opinion/20pubed.html [https://perma.cc/9CYL-FCQZ]. The court also prohibited her
former employer, USA Today, friends, or family from assisting Locy in paying the
mounting daily fees. Id.
166 Sen. John McCain, Mr. President, Stop Attacking the Press, WASH. POST
(Jan. 16, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/mr-president-stop-attackingthe-press/2018/01/16/9438c0ac-faf0-11e7-a46b-a3614530bd87_story.html? utm_term=.7
ae1a418202d [https://perma.cc/YTB2-MRZB].
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first year of the Trump administration, the traditional press has
lost—and will continue to lose—its constitutional freedoms.167
Branzburg v. Hayes, the opinion that gave life to a
reporter’s privilege, was examined at a time in history when an
investigative press and its sources were necessary for “revealing
government corruption, uncovering corporate misbehavior, and
illuminating injustices.”168 Then, like now, the nation was
recovering from a presidential election amid a time where
political scandals were becoming commonplace.
Yet, since Branzburg, the Supreme Court has denied
every petition of certiorari in cases relating to the reporter’s
privilege.169 Today’s chaotic political climate demands that the
Supreme Court address the fragmented framework currently
used to analyze the existence of a reporter privilege. By not
clarifying the murky waters of today’s federal reporter’s
privilege, sources will stop coming forward with the facts and
information vital to the free flow of information.
During his final press conference, former White House Press
Secretary Josh Earnest advised that the press “protect the things
that are worth protecting.”170 Now, more than ever, a journalist’s
relationship with her source is worth protecting. For without its well
of sources, the press cannot serve as our Fourth Estate.
Megan L. Shaw†

167 See, e.g., id.; Jim Rutenberg, In Revoking Press Credentials, Trump Casts
Himself as Punisher in Chief, N.Y. TIMES (June 14, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/
2016/06/15/business/media/donald-trump-washington-post.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/
NLK2-8HKF].
168 Jones, supra note 16, at 1222–23.
169 See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
170 Press Briefing from Press Secretary Josh Earnest, Office of the Press Secretary
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